Though sanctions have yet to play out, deadlock makes force increasingly plausible. However, many analysts and government officials in the United States and elsewhere have taken a glum view about the practicality of such a step. Airstrikes, they argue, may set Tehran back only a few months, and instead energize the government’s efforts to get the bomb.

Policymakers sound stumped. But they shouldn’t be. If the decision to apply force were made, the international community can prevent an Iranian nuclear rebirth through inspectors who have the authority to destroy remaining nuclear contraband.

Farfetched? Not at all. The global community actually did it before — in Iraq 1991-1994. This could repeat in Iran. History provides perspective.

The belief, or, better put, hope that airstrikes can dramatically set back nuclear weapons programs goes back to World War II and the Allied airstrike on the Norsk Hydro heavy water plant in Nazi-occupied Norway. This installation produced a vital ingredient for the German war effort. The bombing did stop one plant — but not the program. Fortunately, Adolf Hitler’s scientists did not figure out the riddles of atomic weapons by V-E Day. Only Germany’s defeat and program dismantlement during occupation ended this program.

In 1981, Israel sought to one-up the World War II template by striking the critical linchpin to Saddam Hussein’s suspect program, the Osirak reactor. The Israelis believed that would end the nuclear threat. The attack came after a slew of other efforts — diplomatic demarches, public relations assassination and sabotage — collectively failed to halt construction of the French-engineered plant. The flawless airstrike destroyed the reactor — and with it Baghdad’s source for nuclear weapons plutonium. But it did not end Iraq’s weapons ambitions.

In the decade that followed, Iraq dramatically increased nuclear funding and personnel. Baghdad turned away from the plutonium to a concealed uranium path to the bomb. It explored multiple enrichment technologies — but the lack of scientific expertise, advanced technology and sophisticated management led to labored progress. All the while, however, Iraqi officials feigned fidelity to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

Then the 1991 Persian Gulf War blew away this facade. U.S. aircraft hit numerous industrial and suspect targets in Iraq, including locations that harbored much of the secret atomic venture.

It was only after the war, however, that the international community realized the program’s scope — uncovering some 40 nuclear facilities that housed three enrichment programs, as well as a plutonium separation facility.

Investigators destroyed all suspect sites and carted off all nuclear material by 1994. The effort was not easy. It had to overcome the continued hostility of Iraqi officials and efforts to hide and deceive. But, in the end, the inspectors got the job done. Iraq had no nuclear infrastructure when the United States invaded in 2003.

The 1991-94 Iraq experience has much to teach us now about the requirements for strike to disarm Iran — if it comes to that. Curiously, the precedent remains ignored in commentary about “what next” after an attack. Attention focuses instead on repeated bombings to halt new construction and demoralize personnel. Without exquisite intelligence, however, such actions won’t identify covert installations and merely perpetuate hostilities.

As Iraq showed, only inspectors on the ground, who are able to interrogate scientists, retrieve records and destroy and remove nuclear remnants, can complete the job of nuclear disarmament.

Policymakers would do well to adopt the template relying for guidance on the Security Council’s 1991 authorization resolution. Key elements required Baghdad to unconditionally surrender nuclear weapons, material and technology to IAEA custody for removal — rendering harmless any remnants, while keeping inspectors on the ground to assure compliance and prevent reconstruction.

Were Washington and its allies to publish their intent to rely on these principles, this would put Iran on notice that any ideas that it could absorb a military strike and rebuild the nuclear enterprise will come to naught. This could add strong leverage to our continuing efforts to get Iran to halt its suspect nuclear activities.

Bennett Ramberg served as a policy analyst in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the George H.W. Bush administration.