The North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces may not yet fully understand the nature or identity of the opposition movement, the nature of Muammar Qadhafi’s hold on power or the depth of the historical east-west divide that defines the conflict.

What started as a popular uprising has turned into a stalemate between regional and tribal factions. To prevent full-blown civil war and forestall the spread of instability throughout the Middle East, the international community must work to broker an end to the stalemate and ensure an orderly transition of power.

The failure of the government’s recent cease-fire overtures, both sides’ repeated insistence on Libya’s territorial integrity and the country’s major oil infrastructure suggest that neither a partition nor a truce that keeps the Qadhafi family in power is likely to end the conflict.

But maintaining the status quo through additional air power or introduction of peacekeepers risks fracturing the coalition and could well serve Qadhafi’s interests in the short term.

Given Libya’s history with factionalism, the end state must include a power-sharing agreement between the eastern opposition and Qadhafi’s support in the west.

Since the 1969 revolution, Qadhafi’s power and legitimacy have been based on an alliance of these western tribes, which dominate the government and security services. Any political settlement must achieve a balance of power that allows for the west’s continued prominence within a more representative framework.

A realistic agreement must do four things: remove Qadhafi and his immediate family from power; co-opt the alliance of western tribes that control the military and government; incorporate eastern opposition leaders into a coalition government; and ensure that neither east nor west dominates.

The international community needs to help facilitate such an agreement by linking continued support for the rebels to guarantees of a negotiated outcome and representative coalition government.

This would be a stunning transformation in Libya. The 1969 Great September Revolution that deposed King Idris was, in a real sense, a victory of the vassal tribes of the west. They were led by the Qadhafa, Warfalla and Magarha tribal alliance, over the east’s ruling tribes.

To prevent a counter-revolution, Qadhafi quickly stripped the eastern tribes of the economic and political advantages they enjoyed under the monarchy. This realignment fueled anger and resentments in the east, especially Benghazi.

For the past 40 years, eastern tribes have viewed Qadhafi as an illegitimate ruler from an insignificant tribe. Their disenfranchisement led to numerous revolts, created openings for Islamic extremists and, to a great degree, fostered the demonstrations that sparked the current uprising.

While the continuing revolts in the western cities of Zintan and Misrata and earlier protests in Tripoli suggest a national popular movement, the opposition is still predominantly eastern.

For example, the National Transition Council’s political and military leadership, including regime defectors such as Mustafa Abdul Jalil and Gen. Abdel Fatah Younis, is made up of members of eastern tribes with a history of opposing the regime. The flag that rebels have carried into battle is that of the former monarchy.

Shaken by the uprisings in usually quiescent western cities, Qadhafi’s tribal alliance was slow to react. But it was quickly galvanized in response to the rebels’ initial march toward Tripoli.

Strong counterattacks by the Libyan military indicate the alliance is now unified in defense of its home territories. Near the Qadhafa tribal stronghold of Sirte, armed civilian militias have displayed their willingness to fight, beating back rebel advances.

Until now, Libya’s western tribes have remained united — less out of solidarity with Qadhafi than to preserve their political and socioeconomic position. The international community may ultimately have to offer guarantees and inducements to turn the western tribes against Qadhafi. Given their often tumultuous relationship with the dictator, peeling away his tribal support base is a realistic political objective.

Disgruntled members of this western alliance have in the past attempted to overthrow him. Early in the current conflict, the large Warfalla tribe, a member of the alliance with a history of rebellion, was reportedly considering joining the opposition. Qadhafi’s initial reliance on mercenaries to quell protests stemmed from his uncertainty about the tribes’ loyalty.

Ensuring a future for Libya’s dominant western tribes — minus Qadhafi’s immediate family — would help prevent the collapse of the government or tribal infighting during transition. Any power vacuum created by the fracturing or wholesale defeat of the western tribal alliance is unlikely to be filled by the disorganized opposition.

Brokering an enduring political solution between east and west won’t be easy. Yet it is a far more sustainable solution than breaking up the state. It will most likely require significant concessions from both sides. Airstrikes on the government military and raids by the ill-equipped opposition are clearly not enough to dislodge Qadhafi nor separate him from his support base.

In fact, the international community’s continued support of the eastern opposition, without making clear an inclusive political end state, risks turning the Libyan uprising into a protracted civil war.

Patricio Asfura-Heim is a political-military analyst with the CNA Center for Strategic Studies, International Affairs Group. His work focuses on the Middle East, counterinsurgency and non-state-centered warfare and revolution.