But even as they hold out hope that Perry can find a way back into contention, some of his advisers have begun laying the groundwork to explain how the Texas governor bombed so dramatically in a race that he seemed to control for a brief period upon his entry in August.

Their explanations for the nosedive come against the backdrop of a campaign riven by an intense, behind-the-scenes power struggle that took place largely between a group of the governor’s longtime advisers and a new cadre of consultants brought on this fall. In the end, the outsiders won out — and ever since have marginalized Perry’s longtime chief strategist while crafting a new strategy in which the Texan has portrayed himself as a political outsider and culture warrior.

In a series of interviews with POLITICO, sources close to the campaign depict a dysfunctional operation that might be beyond saving because of what they describe as the political equivalent of malpractice by the previous regime.

“There has never been a more ineptly orchestrated, just unbelievably subpar campaign for president of the United States than this one,” said a senior Perry adviser.

Perry’s steep plunge from front-runner to butt of jokes was chiefly the result of his own embarrassing verbal stumbles, most notably his insta-classic “oops” moment when he couldn’t recall the names of the cabinet departments he wants to eliminate.

Yet the view of the outsiders who took over Perry’s campaign is that the candidate was set up for failure by an insular group led by Dave Carney, the governor’s longtime political guru, which thought they could run a presidential campaign like a larger version of a gubernatorial race and didn’t take the basic steps needed to professionalize the operation until the candidate already was sinking.

“They put the campaign together like all the other Perry campaigns: raise a bunch of money, don’t worry about the [media coverage], don’t worry about debates and buy the race on TV,” said a top Perry official. “You have to be a total rube to think a race for president is the same as a race for governor.”

Because Perry had never been defeated in his career in state politics — and came from behind to crush Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison in last year’s Texas gubernatorial primary — his Texas operation projected an air of supreme self-assurance and indifference to outside advice.

Carney, a longtime GOP strategist who worked for Bush 41’s presidential campaigns, declined to comment for this story.

“I don’t think so,” he said in response to an email asking to get his side. “Not much good can come from process stories like this.”

In a blistering indictment, sources close to the operation describe a new team that was stunned to arrive in October and find a campaign that wasn’t executing the most rudimentary elements of a modern presidential campaign: no polling or focus groups, no opposition research book on their own candidate to prepare for attacks and debate prep sessions that were barely worth the name.

Further, they were mystified as to why Perry was spending any time and money in New Hampshire, where he was polling in the single digits.

The situation was so dire that the governor’s wife, Anita Perry, convinced her husband that he had to install Joe Allbaugh atop the campaign and effectively exile Carney — who had been Perry’s closest adviser for more than a decade and who sources say had waged a battle against letting the crew-cutted chief of George W. Bush’s 2000 presidential campaign take command.

“Did she have a lot of say to have him make that decision?” said a senior strategist close to Perry. “Yes.”

Perry’s communications director Ray Sullivan, one of the Texas loyalists, said in an interview that he did not want to engage in arguments over what he called “tactical decisions,” but he did offer a broad defense of the early organization against the charges that they were running a White House campaign that was better suited for a governor’s race.

“We took the debates and debate preparations very seriously and we had and have a robust earned media operation,” said Sullivan. “That’s because the campaign was made up of experienced professionals who had done multiple presidential campaigns. This has always been a serious, organized, aggressive campaign operation.”

Added Sullivan: “The people who are giving you that information don’t know what they’re talking about and if they had any courage they would be speaking on the record.”

The communications director, in a subsequent email, took an implied shot at some of the newcomers.

“The Perry team has long been underestimated, but always loyal, disciplined and ultimately successful. This silly sniping is anathema to the loyalty and teamwork that has long characterized Rick Perry’s organizations, and will not distract our team from success in Iowa and beyond,” he said.

One source sympathetic to the Texas crew, though, wasn’t as restrained about sniping and said it was audacious for the new team to point fingers given that they’ve aired over a dozen TV ads in Iowa with new messaging that puts less emphasis on jobs and has done little to improve the governor’s standing here.

Allbaugh, along with consultants Tony Fabrizio, Nelson Warfield, Curt Anderson, David Weeks, and Jim Innocenzi are now overseeing Perry’s strategy as he attempts to finish well enough in Iowa to find a rationale for going forward.

There is hope among Perry’s high command that, if Iowa is jumbled at the top, the Texan can make a stand in South Carolina.

“What if the difference between first and fifth is four points?” asked one Perry strategist.

But even as they make the case for why their candidate can go forward out of Iowa, some members of the Perry team can’t help but look backward and muse over what could have been.

“Everybody has been doing yeoman’s work to get this thing moving again to where the campaign is viable,” said one of the advisers. “It kind of makes you wish you had been there at the start of this thing. He’s been better in the last couple of debates, you know. If somebody had called us in August we may not have had all these problems. Of course, if I was 6’10” I could dunk a basketball.”

When the new forces arrived in mid-October, one of them asked to see the research the campaign had conducted since the governor entered the contest in August.

“I said, ‘Take a look at the polling and focus group stuff to get up to speed,’” recounted an adviser. “They said, ‘We haven’t done any of that.’ I figured they were lying. But, nope, they actually hadn’t done any.”

Also unavailable was an oppo book on Perry that would have laid out his vulnerabilities and the areas where his Republican rivals would attack him.

Without any such guidance — traditional staples of serious White House campaigns — the campaign was flying blind, said the advisers.

Where this hurt them most acutely was in not being able to prepare for how damaging the governor’s support for in-state tuition for illegal immigrants would be. He was attacked in debates over the Texas law he signed that gave the children of illegal immigrants in-state tuition rates and faced sharp questions about the policy on the campaign trail once the issue surfaced.

“They never once considered the notion that in-state tuition for illegals would be a problem,” said a Perry strategist with a measure of incredulity.

“They didn’t do any research on themselves and it wasn’t a big deal in Texas. And if it’s not a big deal in Texas it’s not a big deal anywhere else,” the strategist added sarcastically.

Also typically unimportant in Perry’s Texas campaigns were debates. He did few of them and they had only modest impact on the election results.

So when the governor entered the presidential debate fray in September, he engaged in informal preparations and with little strategy, according to campaign sources.

The candidate’s current gurus point a finger at Carney and Deirdre Delisi, a longtime Perry aide in charge of policy, for setting Perry up for failure at the crucial forums.

“You can’t take a guy running for president and have two hours of arguing about what would be a good thing to say in the debate and then, in the last five minutes of the session, say, ‘Yeah, say that,’” explained a campaign official. “That’s not debate prep. It was amateur hour beyond belief.”

Then there was the moment when Sullivan floated to the media that Perry might just stop showing up at the debates — something that ultimately never happened.

“All the sudden you see in the paper that we may not do debates anymore,” said one Perry official with a sigh. “Awesome.”

Perry advisers say the internal feuding and debate prep problems converged the night in early November when Perry had his cringe-inducing memory lapse on a debate stage in Michigan.

Carney was at that point slowly being eased out of Perry’s inner circle, according to multiple sources. But before the CNBC-sponsored economic forum, a group of the governor’s longtime aides, including Delisi, pleaded with their candidate to let the strategist play a role in the campaign.

Some campaign advisers suggest that Perry then went into the debate rattled and committed his devastating gaffe.

“I don’t believe that is true at all,” countered Sullivan.

When pressed on whether the candidate himself should take the brunt of the blame for his self-inflicted wounds, Perry officials conceded he’d hurt himself in a string of debates. But they argued that his recent performances — in which preparations have been led by Warfield and Mari Will — have been significantly better.

“So that defeats the notion that it’s impossible for him to pull off a debate,” argued an adviser.

But Perry is unambiguously at fault for not taking control of a campaign organization plagued by turmoil and competing factions. For weeks this fall, it was unclear who was in charge of the campaign: the old guard, led by Carney and campaign manager Rob Johnson, or the new additions, represented by Allbaugh and the national strategy team.

When Allbaugh and the consultants first arrived, there were concentric circles of power between the competing groups. Conference calls were disorganized and email chains were filled with a couple dozen staffers debating how exactly the wording of a Tweet in Perry’s name should read.

When Allbaugh sought to consolidate power, the Texas crew intervened with Perry at the Michigan debate and convinced the governor to keep Carney in the fold.

But after Carney engineered a Perry trip to New Hampshire in late November with controversial Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio that was plagued by missteps, the strategist was, as one sourced put it, “exiled” for good and is no longer involved in the strategic decision-making process.

New Hampshire itself was a major issue of contention. Many in the campaign were baffled as to why Carney, a Granite State native and political veteran, wanted Perry to campaign in a culturally alien New England state. And when the candidate went back there at a moment he was drawing only four percent in the polls, it was something of a last straw for Carney, say Perry officials.

“Carney spent a ton of money in New Hampshire, even after the debate disaster — and even though every piece of data showed it was impossible for Perry to even place in New Hampshire,” lamented a Perry strategist.

The failure to get on the Virginia ballot earlier this month, a plight shared with Newt Gingrich, has been a fresh a source of embarrassment for some of the Perry strategists.

“These are folks who you think Newt would hire — oh wait, Newt did hire them,” jabbed one of the strategists, alluding Carney and Johnson’s time leading Gingrich’s campaign earlier this year.

Some in Perry’s camp now openly wonder whether the candidate was prepared for the crucible of a presidential race, not only from a preparation standpoint but also in physical terms.

Perry, who underwent back surgery in July, said to one of his advisers on an ad shoot earlier this month that it was the best he had felt since his operation and conceded that he had underestimated how much the procedure would initially slow him down.

“He struggled with it,” said a source close to Perry about his back. “But I can tell you that for the last month he’s been feeling better.”

Perry officials in both warring camps don’t think he can win Iowa, but believe he’s competitive in a state where they’ve spent millions on TV ads and have put together a solid organization.

“We’re going to wait and see how things work out after we run through the finish line,” said Sullivan about their post-Iowa intentions, noting that they could finish “in the top three.”

Others in Perry’s orbit are anxious to put the experience behind them.

“I’ve never seen anything like this,” said a strategist. “At least not at this level for this serious of a candidate. You see a campaign like this for Herman Cain, you say, ‘Well, that’s what you’d expect. But for a governor from one of the biggest states in the country and someone who can raise a ton of money? It’s mind-boggling. I’m more offended by that than losing.”